Rules and Standards in the Workplace:A Perspective from the Field of Labour Law by Cabrelli, David
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rules and Standards in the Workplace
Citation for published version:
Cabrelli, D 2011, 'Rules and Standards in the Workplace: A Perspective from the Field of Labour Law' Legal
Studies, vol 31, no. 1, pp. 21-41. DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-121X.2010.00179.x
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/j.1748-121X.2010.00179.x
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Legal Studies
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the author's accepted manuscript of the following article: Cabrelli, D. Mar 2011, "Rules and standards in
the workplace: a perspective from the field of labour law", in Legal Studies. 31, 1, p. 21-41, which has been
published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-121X.2010.00179.x/abstract
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RULES AND STANDARDS IN THE  
WORKPLACE: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE  
FIELD OF LABOUR LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DAVID CABRELLI 
 
Solicitor and Lecturer in Commercial Law 
School of Law 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RULES AND STANDARDS IN THE WORKPLACE: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE FIELD 
OF LABOUR LAW: DAVID CABRELLI * 
 
Abstract:  Employment rights may be crafted as ‘bright-line’ rules or open-textured 
standards. Employment rights which are framed at a higher level of generality, such as 
standards, have not been examined in the same level of detail as rules in labour law 
scholarship. Standards can be divided into standards of conduct and standards of review. 
Standards of conduct represent commands to decision makers, such as employers, which 
enable them to scrutinise their decision making internally; whereas standards of review are 
addressed to adjudicators whose function it is to scrutinise the conduct of decision makers 
externally. In the majority of cases, the intensity of scrutiny which is attached to both of these 
standards will be the same, resulting in conflation. However, there is a general assumption 
that in adjudicating disputes involving employment rights, the judiciary is overly deferential to 
the managerial prerogative and this assumption can be corroborated – but also challenged – 
by an analysis which focuses on standards of review quite separately from standards of 
conduct. Such an examination reveals situations in which the level of scrutiny exerted 
externally by the adjudicator pursuant to the standard of review may be less, but also more, 
acute than that attached to the internal standard of conduct. This paper goes on to evaluate 
what the degree of intensity of scrutiny attached to standards of conduct and review reveals 
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about employment rights more generally and erects a framework against which the 
argument about varying intensities of scrutiny can be given greater clarity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper seeks to examine the nature and structure of legal commands which confer 
employment rights in the field of labour law. To that extent, it is engaged in a descriptive 
exposition of, and normative discourse about, the nature and structure of labour laws. In 
pursuing this line of inquiry, the paper adopts a basic distinction between employment rights 
which are expressed as rules and those which are articulated as standards.1 Existing labour 
law scholarship has principally engaged with the significance of legal commands articulated 
as rules which confer employment rights.2 However, this paper marches along an altogether 
different path, seeking to plug a gap in the existing labour law literature by focusing on 
employment rights which are crafted as open-textured legal standards. An employment right 
which is articulated as a standard may be described as a juridical command to an employer 
which draws out the law's expectations about acceptable managerial behaviour at a high 
level of generality. 
In examining standards, a distinction is made in this paper between standards of conduct 
and standards of review. Standards of conduct are directed at employers and delineate the 
nature of the behaviour which the law anticipates from employers and against which 
employers may internally test their conduct and decision making. Meanwhile, standards of 
review represent the external level of scrutiny of managerial decision making and conduct 
which the law expects from adjudicators and so are addressed to such enforcement 
authorities. The significance of the distinction between standards of conduct and review lies 
in the fact that it represents another means of measuring the normative force of laws and 
filling out their meaning. The perspective adopted in this paper is that laws conferring 
employment rights which are drawn as standards are characterised by an internal drift. 
Indeed, it is submitted that the intensity of scrutiny which is attached by a legislator or judge 
to an employment right expressed as a standard tells us something about the strength of (1) 
the fundamental values or particular policy preferences underpinning that particular right and 
(2) the right itself: the greater the deference to management allocated to the standard, the 
less significance the legislature or adjudicator (ie the law maker who was responsible for the 
promulgation of the right) would appear to attach to that right and the inherent policy issues 
or fundamental values which inform its scope and substance. Once this has been 
understood, it is an insight which affords us another yardstick against which employment 
rights can be measured. For example, there is a general assumption that in adjudicating 
disputes involving employment rights, the judiciary is overly deferential to the managerial 
prerogative3 and this assumption can be corroborated – but also challenged – by an analysis 
which focuses on standards of review quite separately from standards of conduct. Such an 
examination reveals situations in which the level of scrutiny exerted externally by the 
adjudicator pursuant to the standard of review may be less, but also more, acute than that 
attached to the internal standard of conduct. 
This paper is split into the following parts. Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4 articulate the differences 
between standards of conduct and review, and explore how the intensity of scrutiny attached 
to standards of conduct and review are forged. Parts 5 and 6 then go on to identify examples 
of divergence between standards of conduct and review from the field of labour law and the 
rationales in favour of such a divide. Finally, in parts 7 and 8, a basic normative structure or 
metric is erected against which the arguments in this paper can be given greater clarity and 
meaning. The final part concludes. 
 
 
1. OF RULES AND STANDARDS 
The aim of this section is twofold: first, to say a little about the defining criteria of rules and 
standards in the field of labour law as a means of differentiating between the two; secondly, 
to address briefly what standards reveal about the character of employment laws.4 It is trite 
to state that one of the key functions of labour law is to strike a balance between 
management and the labour force, or ‘to support and to restrain the power of management 
and the power of organised labour’.5 At the heart of the employment relationship lies the 
managerial prerogative. A consequence of the exercise of managerial autonomy is that the 
employer will take a whole range of decisions having positive and adverse implications for 
employees and their interests. Given the potential for abuse arising from the untrammelled 
application of the managerial prerogative, the common law and Parliament have intervened 
in specific contexts and at different times to introduce laws to police the behaviour of 
employers by conferring rights in favour of employees. Such laws establishing employment 
rights may manifest themselves as (1) rules or (2) standards.6 Rules occasionally impose 
strict liability on employers. Regulations 13 and 13A of the Working Time Regulations 1998, 
SI 1998/1833 are paradigmatic of an employment right expressed as a basic rule, to the 
effect that all employees are entitled to 28 days leave in each leave year. Meanwhile, a 
juridical command which confers rights in favour of employees may be channelled through a 
standard which signposts expectations about managerial behaviour in an open-textured 
manner. Standards represent a less peremptory or compelling form of normativity. For 
example, a possible variation on the theme of regs 13 and 13A of the Working Time 
Regulations 1998 duly expressed in terms of a standard might be a legal command that all 
employers must ensure that their employees take an adequate and appropriate amount of 
leave in any successive annual period. The legal command expressed as a standard is thus 
less precise in nature in comparison with the rule amounting to a tangible differential in 
formal substantive terms.7 Words and phrases such as ‘reasonable’, ‘proportionate’, 
‘rational’, ‘due care’, ‘equitable’, ‘adequate’ and ‘appropriate’ are examples of classic 
standard-like language.8 
The purpose of making the categorical distinction between rules and standards in this paper 
is essentially geared towards the adoption of an organising framework. This framework 
enables us to move on to a consideration of the issues which influence the nature of 
standards, and the identification and rationalisation of the elements which shape the level of 
intensity of scrutiny of managerial action (duly exerted internally by employers and externally 
by an adjudicator) pursuant to the application of such standards. Furthermore, inherent 
within the acknowledgment of the existence of standards is the recognition that the 
normative force of certain employment rights cannot be conceptualised as static or fixed. 
Rather, that those rights possess an intrinsic capacity to drift in terms of their force of 
application once instantiated within a particular fact-dependent context. This insight 
encourages us to engage in a more nuanced dialogue about standards and to divide them 
into two separate camps which are mutually exclusive, yet interdependent. That is to say, 
that standards may be segregated into standards of conduct and standards of review. This 
distinction is particularly important since it presupposes that the strength of standards may 
drift and vacillate in terms of intensities of scrutiny. 
 
2. OF STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Standards may be divided into ‘standards of conduct’ and ‘standards of review’. What is the 
distinction between them? Is it a positivistic, source-based distinction in the sense that 
standards of conduct are, by necessity, promulgated by the legislature with the standard of 
review duly handed down by an adjudicator (or vice versa), or is the threshold criteria 
predicated on the object of the instruction, ie the legal person to whom the standard is 
addressed? In order to answer this question, one is required to consult existing scholarship 
in the area of corporate law:9 
‘A standard of conduct states how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a given 
role. A standard of review states the test a court should apply when it reviews an actor's 
conduct to determine whether to impose liability or grant injunctive relief.’ 
In the labour law context of legal commands conferring employment rights, standards of 
conduct are directed at employers, whereas standards of review are addressed to the 
tribunals and courts.10 Thus, the source of the standard is not the distinguishing criteria and 
so it is perfectly possible for (1) standards of review to be set by the legislature or self-
generated by subsequent modification by an adjudicator or (2) standards of conduct to be 
promulgated by an adjudicator, eg where the common law ‘creates’ a new right which is 
expressed as a standard. 
Standards of conduct prescribe ‘conduct rules’ and guide employers on how they ought to 
act in a given situation. It is more common for such standards of conduct to be crafted by the 
legislature than an adjudicator. For example, in terms of a statutory provision, an 
employment right may be expressed as a standard of conduct to the effect that all employers 
must ensure that their employees take an adequate and appropriate amount of leave in any 
successive annual period. The internal actions and decision making of employers are thus 
guided when they are engaged in fixing the annual leave requirements of their employees by 
reference to an ‘adequate and appropriate’ standard of conduct. An example is the 
command to employers in s 4A(1) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA)11 to make 
‘reasonable’ adjustments to the workplace in order to accommodate their disabled 
employees. 
Meanwhile, standards of review prescribe ‘decision rules’ and determine how an adjudicator 
ought to analyse externally the decisions or actions of the employer to whom the standard of 
conduct was addressed.12 In contrast with standards of conduct, standards of review are 
directed towards adjudicators. The common law of the contract of employment prescribes an 
implied term that an employer's decision to award (or not award) discretionary bonuses or 
benefits must not be made irrationally, perversely or contrary to good faith.13 Here, in terms 
of the standard of review, the command to an adjudicator is to apply a rationality standard 
and so adjudicators must assess whether an employer's decision and actions were rational 
and bona fides. 
In order to give the contours of the standard of review more substance, one can build on the 
above ‘annual leave’ example. Thus, in the case of a dispute about the legality of the 
decision of an employer in allocating a period of annual leave to an employee, in the 
absence of further guidance in the statutory provision, the adjudicator would be required to 
determine whether the period fixed by the employer met the test of ‘adequa[cy] and 
appropriate[ness]’. In such an example, the standard of conduct and standard of review are 
conflated. That is to say, that the degree of scrutiny internally exerted by the employer over 
his own conduct is set at the same level as the intensity of scrutiny to be applied externally 
by the adjudicator, namely a test of what is ‘adequate and appropriate’. Although standards 
of review are more commonly created by adjudicators, they may also be set by the 
legislature. An example of the latter process is the proportionality standard,14 which is 
addressed to adjudicators as a means of enabling them to assess the lawfulness of an 
employer's indirectly discriminatory practices.15 Moreover, when initially crafted by the 
legislature, the standard of review may be subsequently modified by an adjudicator.16 In the 
field of labour law, the classic example of such modification is the replacement of what 
appears to be a purely ‘objective reasonableness’ standard with the ‘range of reasonable 
responses’ test in the law of unfair dismissal in terms of s 98(4) of the Employment Rights 
Act 1996 (ERA). 
 
3. FIXING THE STANDARD OF CONDUCT 
The basic premise of part 2 above is that standards of conduct and standards of review can 
be evaluated in terms of the internal and external scrutiny which they exert over a particular 
actor. This section seeks to address the basis on which the legislature or adjudicator (ie the 
relevant law maker) fixes the intensity of scrutiny of the standard of conduct attached to a 
particular employment right. Furthermore, what does the chosen measure of scrutiny of the 
standard of conduct tell us about that specific employment right? Here, it is posited that there 
is considerable force in the argument that the more fundamental the values or principles 
which influence the promulgation, and inform the substance, of an employment right, the 
more stringent (in the sense of the intensity of scrutiny) the standard allocated to an 
employment right ought to be. To that extent, the level of scrutiny exerted upon managerial 
behaviour would intensify proportionately to the criticality of the right in terms of principle. 
Thus, if a person was entrusted with the task of designing a system of labour law afresh, it is 
argued that there is force in the proposition that that person ought to benchmark the intensity 
of the standard of conduct against the desirability of achieving certain fundamental values or 
objectives. Standards of conduct would be calibrated so that they were reflective of 
fundamental conceptions and values which currently underpin employment relations, such 
as dignity, respect, cooperation, partnership, inclusion and competitiveness.17 Such a 
conceptualisation of a standard has been advocated by commentators at an abstract level 
and in isolation from particular substantive areas of law, ie that underlying social, economic 
and other values and principles set the ‘looseness’ or stringency of the measure of scrutiny 
of a standard and that such values are conditioned by the right which the standard 
represents.18 
Whilst such an approach is attractive, there are particular difficulties which must be 
overcome. First, one of the drawbacks of applying such an approach which focuses on a 
particular employment right in isolation is that it perhaps serves to cloud our ability to view 
employment rights in the round. If the standards of conduct associated with different 
employment rights vary in levels of intensity due to the nature of the fundamental values 
which underpin each right, from a perspective which sees labour law as an autonomous 
body of law (to which those rights analysed duly belong), issues of internal coherence are 
somewhat elided. In other words, in diverse contexts, and sometimes in the same context, 
employers are enjoined to scrutinise internally their actions and decision making according 
to diverse standards which vary in the degree of scrutiny of managerial action. This is a 
fundamental point to which the writer will turn in greater detail in a future article. A more 
obvious difficulty is that any normative framework which seeks to fix a standard of conduct 
on this basis must itself first establish a wholly separate framework regarding a hierarchy of 
employment rights in terms of some being more fundamental than others – and this would 
be gauged with reference to the level of significance of the underpinning values and 
objectives.19 The difficulty with such an endeavour is that it is an inherently subjective pursuit 
which is value-laden in nature. Hence, an alternative way of approaching the normative 
significance of standards is to turn matters on their head and to argue that the intensity of 
scrutiny which is attached to a right tells us something about how fundamental a legislature 
or adjudicator (ie the law maker responsible for promulgating the standard and the 
associated employment right) considers the values underpinning that particular right to be. 
To articulate this point in another way, if one were to chart the standards of conduct attached 
to employment rights presently existing in the field of labour law, there would be some 
correlation between the extent of the internal deference to the employer associated with the 
selected standard and the significance with which the law would appear to treat the right and 
the latent values which influence its content and scope of application.20 In terms of such a 
framework, one can begin to understand the level of importance which a system of labour 
law attaches to particular employment rights. Pursuing this point a little further, it also means 
that a selected number of employment rights can be scrutinised with a hierarchy of intensity 
of standards of conduct identified in terms of those rights, which, in turn, enables the 
significance or relative strength of such employment rights to be charted against a reliable 
metric or spectrum.21 
 
4. FIXING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Part 2 above proceeded generally on the implicit assumption that the standard of conduct 
and review would be conflated in terms of the measure of scrutiny. However, it is also 
perfectly possible for conceptual space to exist between them. What is meant by ‘conceptual 
space’ in this context? Here, an example is of assistance. To borrow from the 
aforementioned ‘annual leave’ example in part 2 above, imagine that the above statutory 
provision is supplemented by a further statutory provision. The latter provision directs an 
adjudicator towards further particular factors, to the effect that ‘in ascertaining whether the 
period of leave set by the employer in a successive annual period is adequate and 
appropriate in terms of subsection [x] above, an employment tribunal or court shall (a) have 
regard to the financial resources, size and administrative resources of the employer and (b) 
assess whether such period of leave is justifiable, having regard to the legitimate business 
aims and needs of the employer’. In such an example, the notion of a distinction between the 
standard of conduct and the standard of review assumes great practical relevance. If the 
employer sought to resist liability by demonstrating to an adjudicator that the period of leave 
was ‘adequate and appropriate’, it would be missing the point. Although the employer 
is internally directed to consider the adequacy and appropriateness of the period which it has 
set, the intensity of scrutiny to be applied externally by the adjudicator represents a 
particularly diluted version of the intensity of the standard of conduct which is addressed 
towards the employer. The instruction to the adjudicator to take into account (1) the financial 
position of the employer and (2) the justifiability of the period of leave fixed by the employer 
in light of the employer's commercial interests, imports particularly subjective factors into the 
adjudicator's assessment, ie consideration of what is reasonable for the employer in the 
instant factual setting rather than what is reasonable according to the mores of society at 
large or the court or tribunal itself. Thus, what is ‘adequate and appropriate’ in the 
circumstances is not to be analysed on a purely objective basis which would entitle the 
adjudicator to be more intrusive in its scrutiny. Instead, the standard of review points the 
adjudicator towards a mixed subjective and objective examination of the period of leave from 
the perspective of the employer, amounting to an approach which is more forgiving of the 
employer. Thus, the standard of conduct and standard of review may in theory diverge and 
the introduction of a more deferential standard of review is merely another technique 
available to the law to dilute or lighten normative controls imposed upon management. 
Of course, one might argue that no such divergence in practical terms exists, ie that the 
distinction (1) has no application in practice in the field of labour law and so by necessity 
must be uninteresting or unsound and/or (2) is redundant. There are a number of possible 
rationales for the adoption of such a position. First, that since it is difficult to identify specific 
circumstances in which the standards of conduct and review diverge, the distinction should 
be cast aside. In part 5 below, this paper will draw out compelling examples from the field of 
labour law which serve to underscore the presence of the distinction. A second objection to 
the soundness of the distinction is related to the approach of the gatekeepers of the law, 
namely the legal practitioners or other professional advisers who communicate the intensity 
of the standards to employers. Solicitors and barristers may well opt to take the safest 
strategy available by advising management on the basis of the higher of the standard of 
conduct or standard of review in terms of the level of scrutiny of managerial action. In other 
words, the argument runs that the manner in which the intensities of scrutiny of the 
standards of conduct and review are communicated renders the distinction meaningless in 
theory and practice. However, it is submitted that the nature by which the standards are 
communicated to management does not mean that the messages which the law transmits to 
management and the adjudicator in separate strands are not distinct. Instead, it merely 
dictates that the means and methods by which these standards are expressed to 
management may on occasion be undertaken by advisers with the better part of caution. A 
third possible reason for arguing that there is no such distinction is that adjudicators are 
simply engaged in a process of interpreting the standard which is set down in the particular 
source of law, whether it be common law or statute. If the adjudicator adopts or applies what 
appears to be a different standard from that which appears to have been suggested by the 
common law or the wording of the relevant legislation, this does not necessarily signify the 
presence of two distinctive standards. Rather, there is a simpler explanation and that is that 
the process is purely indicative of statutory or legal interpretation in operation. Whilst this is a 
compelling argument, the examples selected from the field of labour law, and considered 
below in part 5, will demonstrate that something more than an interpretative process is being 
pursued where there is evidence to suggest that standards of conduct and standards of 
review diverge. Indeed, that adjudicators are engaged in something much more profound 
than a process of construction. 
 
5. EXAMPLES OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND 
REVIEW IN LABOUR LAW 
As a means of demonstrating that adjudicators are engaging in more than mere 
interpretation in forging a distinction between standards of conduct and standards of review, 
it is beneficial to take some real live examples from the field of labour law. First, consider the 
statutory employment right not to be unfairly dismissed. In determining whether an 
employee's dismissal is substantively ‘unfair’, s 98(4) of the ERA instructs employers to act 
reasonably in treating the employee's misconduct, incapability, lack of qualifications, 
redundancy, breach of duty or statute, retirement (or some other substantial reason 
identified by the employer) as a sufficient reason for dismissal, taking into account the 
employer's size and administrative resources. Moreover, and very importantly, the language 
of s 98(4) of the ERA is such that it is sufficiently clear that it is also addressed to an 
adjudicator. Thus, it is submitted that s 98(4) amounts to a complex amalgam of a standard 
of conduct and standard of review. But what is the standard of conduct and review 
envisaged by s 98(4)? By treating the standard of conduct and review as one of 
‘reasonableness’ in s 98(4) ERA for the purposes of the ‘fairness’ of the employer's decision 
to dismiss,22 one might well argue that the intention of Parliament was to command 
employers and adjudicators to apply an objective reasonableness test. An ‘objective 
reasonableness’ standard confers a power upon an adjudicator to subrogate itself to a legal 
person and freely apply its mind as to whether that person's decision, actions, conduct or 
omissions were ‘reasonable’ or not. As MacCormick has remarked, ‘[l]awyers . . . have not 
characterised the “reasonable” as involving a subjective test . . . [i]n law what is reasonable 
is commonly deemed an “objective” matter. . . .’23 Such a rationalisation of s 98(4) of the 
ERA is advanced by Freer24 and, so, employers and adjudicators would be guided towards a 
consideration as to whether dismissal would be, or was, objectively an unreasonable 
decision. However, this approach neglects the legislature's express invitation to employers 
and adjudicators to take into account the employer's size and administrative resources. This 
introduces certain subjective25 considerations into the equation for the purposes of the 
exertion of internal and external scrutiny of the decision to dismiss. Thus, on the face of s 
98(4), the effect appears to be that the standard of conduct and standard of review guides 
both employers and adjudicators towards the application of a ‘strong’ objective 
reasonableness test, duly tempered by the importation of a ‘weak’ subjective element into 
the equation. 
However, the judiciary have consistently stated that s 98(4) of the ERA requires an 
adjudicator to apply the ‘range of reasonable responses’ test.26 This formula represents a 
self-generated modification of the standard of review by an adjudicator. It channels the 
adjudicator towards a consideration of the band of responses which a reasonable employer 
might take in the face of the particular actions or omissions of the employee. Importantly, the 
‘range’ test deprives the court or tribunal of a free hand to substitute its own judgment for 
that of the employer or to articulate what ought to have been done by the employer by 
reference to its own standards or the mores of society at large. Instead, it entails the 
application of a mixture of objective and subjective considerations: objective to the extent 
that the tribunal or court must identify how different reasonable employers might react to the 
employee's actions or omissions; yet, subjective27 in (1) a ‘weak’ form in the sense that s 
98(4) of the ERA enjoins the tribunal or court to take into account subjective criteria, such as 
the size and administrative resources of the employer, thus enjoining the adjudicator to 
afford ‘some allowance not only for external facts, but also for personal characteristics of the 
actor himself’28 and (2) in a ‘strong’ sense to the extent that, by adopting internal practices 
and formal, written procedures and policies which underscore the particular economic 
interests of the organisation, there is clearly scope for the employer to channel the 
parameters of an adjudicator's evaluation of the employer's decision making and conduct 
towards a more lenient subjective assessment.29 
A further example of the divergence between the standard of conduct and review in labour 
law is provided by s 3A(1) and (3) of the DDA.30 Section 3A(1) of the DDA articulates the 
standard of conduct which the legislature expects of an employer of disabled persons in the 
context of the concept of ‘disability-related discrimination’. The command to the employer in 
s 3A(1) of the DDA is that it must not without justification treat a disabled person for a reason 
which relates to his disability any less favourably than it treats or would treat others to whom 
the reason does not or would not apply. For the purposes of evaluating whether the 
employer has advanced a valid justification for treating the disabled employee less 
favourably than others, the legislature stipulates in s 3A(3) of the DDA that an adjudicator 
must adopt a standard of review which seeks to assess whether the employer's reason for 
the treatment was ‘both material to the circumstances of the particular case and substantial’. 
If theemployer fails to show material and substantial reasons for such less favourable 
treatment, it will be deemed to have committed ‘disability-related discrimination’ and will be 
held liable. On the face of it, language such as ‘the circumstances of the particular case’ 
suggests that the material and substantial reasons factor would involve the adjudicator 
applying an objective measure of scrutiny of the employer's actions and reasoning for the 
less favourable treatment. In that way, the adjudicator would be entitled to form its own 
opinion as to how it would have acted or decided matters and then substitute its own 
judgment for that of the employer as to what constituted ‘material and substantial reasons’.31 
However, by introducing a variant of the ‘range of reasonable responses’ test in Jones v 
Post Office,32 like s 98(4) of the ERA, the judiciary self-generated another modification of the 
applicable standard of review. In cases involving the employer's justification defence under s 
3A(3) of the DDA, Jones directs that adjudicators must assess whether the employer's 
reason for the treatment fell within the ‘range of material and substantial reasons’. Like the 
‘range of reasonable responses’ test, the ‘range of material and substantial reasons’ test 
compels the adjudicator to proceed on the basis of a mixed objective/subjective approach. It 
is objective in the sense that an adjudicator must determine the reasons which different 
reasonable employers might recognise as material and substantial in a similar case, and 
subjective since the assumption of internal, formal and written procedures and policies by 
the employer which reveal its particular economic goals, objectives and interests enable it to 
guide the adjudicator's evaluation of the employer's decision making and conduct towards a 
more lenient subjective assessment. 
It is clear that by adopting the ‘range of reasonable responses’ and ‘range of material and 
substantial reasons’ tests as the standards of review for s 98(4) of the ERA and s 3A(3) of 
the DDA, the judiciary have articulated a modification of the standard of review and, in doing 
so, have acted to craft a distinction between the standard of conduct which the law expects 
of the employer (ie the standard of conduct to which an employer should conform and 
internally evaluate its decision making in the context of dismissal and disability-related 
discrimination) and the standard of review which the adjudicator must apply to the 
employer's decision (ie the standard according to which the adjudicator must review the 
employer's decision to dismiss or its reasons for the less favourable treatment). Thus, the 
modification results in clear conceptual space between the standard of conduct and the 
standard of review to be applied by an adjudicator in the case of unfair dismissal and 
disability-related discrimination. The standard of review is more deferential to the managerial 
prerogative and tolerant of the employer's discretionary power than the standard of conduct. 
It is submitted that the rationales for the articulation of such a distinction in the case of unfair 
dismissal and disability-related discrimination are demonstrative of something more symbolic 
than a process of construction. But, in what way? 
 
6. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DIVERGENCE 
A number of rationales for divergence between standards of conduct and review have been 
propounded in the existing literature. For example, Eisenberg argues for bounded rationality 
as a rationale for divergence in terms of which the standard of review is set at a less 
intensive degree of scrutiny than the standard of conduct.33 Here, the underlying notion is 
that there is a differential in legal knowledge between an employer and an adjudicator. 
Whilst an adjudicator will be instructed by counsel in the detailed aspects of employment law 
(or will be aware of the body of employment law as an experienced and qualified lawyer), an 
employer will labour under limited knowledge and will invariably decide how to act on the 
basis of incomplete information. Moreover, as a normative proposition, employers should not 
be expected to understand the entire body of employment law or consult legal practitioners 
before making decisions: the costs associated with such endeavours would be prohibitive to 
the employer. In such circumstances, Eisenberg argues that ‘the legal messages which are 
primarily directed to [employers]– that is, standards of conduct – should be simple, so that 
they can be effectively communicated’.34 Thus, the argument from simplicity/complexity 
provides explanatory force for a distinction between the intensity of scrutiny attached to the 
standard of conduct and standard of review. 
Furthermore, in the context of the law of directors' duties in American corporate law, Allen, 
Jacobs and Strine have argued that divorcing the standard of conduct from the standard of 
review will be appropriate in certain factual contexts.35 Allen, Jacobs and Strine argue that 
divorcing the standard of conduct from the standard of review, with the latter being set at a 
more lenient (from the perspective of the employer) level than the former, will be appropriate 
in two particular circumstances, which themselves tend to overlap to some degree: first, 
where (1) it is clear that more than one decision may be appropriate in response to a given 
set of circumstances; or, secondly, where (2) it is difficult for adjudicators to differentiate 
between ‘bad’ decisions taken by the employer from ‘good’ decisions taken by an employer 
which turn out ‘badly’.36 In some circumstances, eg where the law has to decide whether a 
person's actions were negligent in tort, it is common that only one decision is ‘good’, so that 
decisions which turn out to have harmful effects will usually amount to bad decisions; 
however, in other contexts, the assessment of a person's decision making may not be so 
straightforward, particularly where there is an expectation that it will be part of the decision-
making process to take commercial risks. In circumstances where (1) and (2) exist, the 
divergence in the standard of conduct and standard of review is simply a matter of ‘practical 
fairness’ to the decision maker, resulting in a ‘zone of protection’.37 
To confer greater clarity on the meaning of factor (2) above, consider the example of an 
employer who decides to expand its business by opening a new store and employing five 
employees. The venture is initially successful generating healthy returns, but ultimately, 6 
years later, the store is closed with the loss of the five jobs. With the benefit of hindsight, it is 
tempting for an adjudicator to come to the view that the decision to expand the business was 
a ‘bad’ decision, that it was pre-ordained to result in the redundancies and that each of the 
economic dismissals were unfair in terms of ss 95 and 98 of the ERA. However, such a 
rationalisation of the position may be misguided, since it fails to countenance the possibility 
that the resolution of the employer to expand may have been a ‘good’ decision which, for 
faultless reasons, simply turned out badly. Here, the ‘hindsight bias’ phenomenon comes 
into play. That is to say that when adjudicators evaluate the past decisions of third parties 
with the knowledge of how things actually turned out, as a matter of behavioural psychology 
they will inevitably overestimate the likelihood of the actual outcome at the time the decision 
was made by that third party.38 The danger is that what was in fact a ‘good’ decision which 
turned out badly could be misclassified as a ‘bad’ decision ab initio. For that reason, a 
finding that the dismissals of the five employees were unfair would be misguided. 
Applying the insights of Allen, Jacobs and Strine to the example of unfair dismissal in labour 
law, it could be argued that, in the context of disciplinary proceedings initiated by an 
employer against an employee for reasons of misconduct, capacity, etc,39 more than one 
decision may be reasonable or appropriate. One of the reasonable decisions may be 
dismissal, another to give the employee a final written warning, another to give the employee 
a second written warning, etc.40 Thus, in terms of Allen, Jacobs and Strine's approach, on 
the grounds of being realistic and ‘practically fair’ to the decision maker, the judiciary are 
justified in affording a margin of discretion to the employer by modifying the standard of 
review to the less intrusive (in terms of the evaluative function) range of reasonable 
responses test. The outcome is the application of a more lenient standard of review than the 
standard of conduct. The alternative option of continuing to equate the standard of conduct 
and the standard of review as articulated by the legislature in s 98(4) of the ERA would be 
too strict and arguably unfair in practical terms on employers, since it would presuppose that 
only one course of conduct is reasonable – which in the case of an employer's decision-
making task in the face of misconduct, incapacity, etc, is patently not the case. Thus, the 
adoption of the range of reasonable responses test as the standard of review by the courts 
and tribunals to the adjudication of the question of unfair dismissal imports further elements 
of subjectivity into proceedings for reasons of ‘practical fairness’. 
Another argument put forward by Allen, Jacobs and Strine is that a divergence between the 
standard of conduct and the standard of review is justified where there is a role for the 
pursuit of legitimate policy preferences.41 Therefore, the standard of review to be applied to 
determine whether an employer should be found liable ought to be reflective of substantive 
policy considerations. Are there strong arguments for policy preferences to be given 
particular weight in the context of an employer's decision to dismiss, which justify the 
downwards modification of the standard of review to an intensity of scrutiny which is more 
deferential to the managerial prerogative? In the context of dismissal, Collins has identified 
an implicit policy choice on the part of the judiciary in favour of an approach towards limited 
judicial interference in the managerial prerogative to dismiss its employees. That is to say 
that the policy preference is to legitimise the restriction of judicial intervention to 
circumstances where the actions of an employee have not resulted in harm to the 
employer's legitimate commercial interests.42 In cases where the commercial interests of 
employers are affected by the conduct, capacity, etc of an employee, such a policy choice 
endorses the construction of a standard of review such as the range test which affords a 
wider remit of discretion to the employer for the purposes of the evaluation of the 
‘substantive’ fairness of the decision to dismiss. 
However, what are the policy factors which justify the manipulation of the standard of review 
to a more deferential standard of review in the context of disability-related discrimination 
under s 3A(1) and (3) of the DDA? Here, the opinion of Elias J (as he then was) in the case 
of Heathrow Express Operating Co Ltd v Jenkins43 is particularly instructive. The tenor of 
Elias J's judgment44 is that the s 3A(3) DDA justification test in the context of disability-
related discrimination operates at the more lenient standard of a range of material and 
substantial reasons test in order to respect the prerogative afforded to management in 
choosing how to organise its business practices. Here, there is an implicit recognition by 
adjudicators that there may be good commercial or other reasons for an employer to adopt a 
commercial function or practice which nevertheless inadvertently results in a person who is 
disabled suffering less favourable treatment on the basis of a reason related to that person's 
disability. Thus, the adjudicators' perception of the policy towards s 3A(1) and (3) is that it is 
not concerned with changing the employer's commercial operations. Rather, adjudicators 
view it as a means of assessing the weight of the rationales for certain practices which result 
in less favourable treatment by reference to a ‘material and substantial’ criterion. This is in 
stark contrast with the adjudicators' perception of the policy objectives underpinning the 
disabled employee's right to enjoin his/her employer to make reasonable adjustments in ss 
3A(2) and 4A(1) of the DDA, ie the notions of positive discrimination and substantive 
equality.45 
Davies has argued that ‘there is a tendency among labour lawyers to regard the courts with 
suspicion [and that] the perception is that the judges are hostile to the interests of 
workers . . . [and] favour the interests of employers’.46 Whilst there is considerable force in 
this sentiment, eg see the discussion above in the context of the judicial formulation of the 
more forgiving ‘range of reasonable responses’ and ‘range of material and substantial 
reasons’ standards of review, there are also examples where the courts have gone the other 
way and intervened to forge a distinction between the standard of conduct and the standard 
of review, whereby the level of scrutiny associated with the latter is pitched at a higher level 
than the former. It is interesting to assess the policy reasons which provided the basis for the 
adjudicator to adopt such a divergence. The ‘duty to make reasonable adjustments’,47 which 
is encountered in the field of disability discrimination law, is quite revealing. In terms of s 
4A(1) of the DDA,48 in discharging its obligation to make adjustments to the physical aspects 
of premises or provisions, criteria and practices, the duty of the employer is to take such 
steps as are reasonable, in all the circumstances of the case. The language of s 4A(1) of the 
DDA is clear to the effect that it is addressed towards employers and so duly establishes the 
standard of conduct. Thus, the standard of conduct which is directed at the employer is to 
act reasonably. In determining what is ‘reasonable’, it is submitted that there are three 
possible formulations open to an adjudicator in crafting the standard of review. First, what is 
reasonable may be judged according to a subjective standard of review which is particularly 
lenient. According to such a prescription, the employer would be deemed to have discharged 
its duty to make reasonable adjustments if the adjudicator was satisfied that the employer 
itself had a genuine belief (1) that its conduct was reasonable or lawful, (2) that it had 
complied with the duty or (3) that the reason for its conduct was reasonable or lawful. An 
alternative would be to apply the ‘range of reasonable responses’ standard. In terms of such 
a formulation, the employer would be deemed to have failed to discharge its duty to make 
reasonable adjustments if the court or tribunal had identified a band or range of responses 
which a reasonable employer would have taken and the decisions or actions taken, or 
sanctions adopted, by the employer did not feature on the list of reasonable responses 
identified by the court or tribunal. Whilst not as lenient as the first subjective standard of 
reasonableness, the range of reasonable responses standard is indeed relatively forgiving. 
However, it is the third possibility which has been adopted by the judiciary as the applicable 
standard of review. This is amply demonstrated by Collins v Royal National Theatre Board 
Ltd.49 and the judgment of Kay LJ in Smith v Churchills Stairlifts plc.50 Here it was ruled that 
the appropriate standard of review was one of objective reasonableness. An objective 
standard enjoins a more intrusive degree of intervention than the other two possibilities, 
since, as articulated above, the adjudicator has the right to substitute its own judgment for 
that of the employer by reference to a hypothetical reasonable employer. The selection of 
the objective reasonableness standard of review tells us a significant amount about the level 
of importance which adjudicators afford to the employment right. It also fits with our 
understanding of the philosophy which lies at the heart of the duty to make reasonable 
adjustments in the DDA. The duty to make reasonable adjustments is concerned with the 
encouragement of positive discrimination, ie substantive equality, in favour of disabled 
employees and the collective goal behind the policy initiative is to increase the number of 
disabled persons in the workplace. In Archibald v Fife Council, Baroness Hale of Richmond 
recognised ‘that the [duty to make reasonable adjustments in the DDA] entails a measure of 
positive discrimination, in the sense that employers are required to take steps to help 
disabled people which they are not required to take for others’.51 
Whilst it is useful to consider the circumstances in which a departure of the standard of 
review from the standard of conduct is justified, it is also worthwhile to pause for a moment 
to ask what the value in the distinction between the two standards is in more abstract terms. 
Here, it is submitted that, at a conceptual level, the courts are engaged in something more 
than a simple process of interpretation. Instead, implicit in the recognition of the distinction is 
the realisation that employers and adjudicators possess differing levels of knowledge about 
the employer's general managerial practices and behaviour, including the circumstances 
surrounding and influencing any managerial decision which an adjudicator may be required 
to evaluate. It is more often than not the case that there will be a knowledge deficit on the 
part of the adjudicator regarding the commercial environment of the employer. Thus the 
adjudicator will labour under an informational deficit in the sense that they are privy to 
imperfect information. In such circumstances, the distinction between the standard of 
conduct and the standard of review or the modification of the standard of review possesses 
practical force, since there is merit in the law prescribing differing intensities of scrutiny to 
both standards lest the law wishes to subject itself to the charge that it lacks legitimacy. 
Moreover, the importance of the distinction between the two standards lies in its correlation 
to the conception of law as an instrument which possesses symbolical value in its own right, 
in the sense that the law is more than simply a coercive tool and functions to communicate 
authoritative moral guidance about the manner in which employers ought to behave and 
exercise the managerial prerogative. In such a way, the law articulates the expectations 
which it has of the employer via the standard of conduct, and the message which the law 
sends to the employer is morally and politically charged. Of course, there may well be 
dissonance between that message and the message which is communicated to the 
adjudicator via the standard of review, which itself contains a moral component. But the 
utility in the distinction between the two standards in that scenario lies not so much in the 
way that it coerces or enjoins the employer and adjudicator to comply with the standard, than 
in the symbolic value attached to the different messages which are sent to the recipients. 
The insights afforded by the ‘practical fairness’ and ‘policy’ perspectives identified above as 
justifications for the erection of differing standards of conduct and standards of review 
represent useful instruments of analysis in the context of employment rights articulated as 
standards in the field of labour law more generally. For example, consider the situation 
where calls are being made for the reform of an employment right with a particularly lax 
standard of review on the basis that the standards of review applied in the context of a series 
of other employment rights attract a greater intensity of scrutiny. Rather than invoking the 
comparative strength of other standards of review as a rationale for reform, it is submitted 
that the consideration and evaluation of the ‘practical fairness’ and policy constructs 
identified by Allen, Jacobs and Strine represent particularly useful criteria. Their application 
in the case of the particular employment right under attack can function to supply justificatory 
foundations for a relevant package of reform which are much more conceptually forceful 
than rationales based on casual formalistic observations that, since a lax standard of review 
exists in such a context, labour law inevitably suffers from condemnable incoherence and 
that measures ought to be taken to initiate change. By focusing on the nature of the decision 
taken by the employer (which will obviously be conditioned by the relevant employment right 
under examination), whether it is clear that more than one decision may be appropriate 
taking into account the underlying facts surrounding that decision and the policy issues 
informing and underpinning such decisions, law makers or law reformers can come to a 
more informed and balanced view as to the manner in which adjudicators should approach 
the task of review. If more than one decision may be appropriate in a given set of 
circumstances, then, on fairness grounds, absent any consideration of policy factors, 
articulating a standard of review based on a lower degree of scrutiny than the standard of 
conduct may be warranted. Moreover, where there are good policy reasons for selecting a 
standard of review which is more deferential to management than the standard of conduct, 
again this may be a valid choice. However, where the ‘fairness’ criteria or policy 
considerations travel in opposite directions, the strength of each will be important in 
fashioning the standard of review.52 In other contexts, the overwhelming force of policy 
factors surrounding an employment right may provide an adjudicator with sufficient guidance 
and justification for drawing a standard of review at a more exacting level of scrutiny than the 
standard of conduct (eg s 4A of the DDA). In this way, one can seek to extract the defining 
conditions for standards of adjudicatory review which, in the circumstances, may suggest 
criteria which are less or more lenient towards the evaluation of an employer's conduct or 
decision making than the standard of conduct.53 
 
7. FIXED AND ‘FLOATING’ STANDARDS 
Standards may be fixed or ‘floating’ when evaluated in terms of the internal and/or external 
intensity of scrutiny which they entail. Objective reasonableness and subjective 
reasonableness standards are examples of fixed standards, since the intensity of scrutiny 
which they envisage is uniform once it has been set. For example, in the case of a subjective 
reasonableness standard of review, the adjudicator must ensure that the employer itself had 
a genuine belief (1) that its conduct was reasonable or lawful or (2) that the reason for its 
conduct was reasonable or lawful. Meanwhile, in the case of an objective reasonableness 
standard of review, a more intrusive degree of intervention is demanded. In terms of such a 
standard, what the employer thought was reasonable or what a range of differing reasonable 
employers might have decided or done in similar or different circumstances is irrelevant. 
Instead, an adjudicator is empowered to substitute its own judgment for that of the employer 
by reference to a hypothetical reasonable employer, the characteristics of which it has a free 
hand to craft. 
Fixed standards can be contrasted with floating standards. Floating standards are context-
dependent and so the intensity of scrutiny (which is exerted internally by a decision maker 
pursuant to the standard of conduct or externally by an adjudicator pursuant to the standard 
of review) varies in accordance with the facts of each particular case. Two classic examples 
which are found in labour law are the ‘range of reasonable responses’ and the proportionality 
tests. In the case of the range test, certain subjective criteria which are fixed by reference to 
the size, resources, nature, practices and/or pursuits of the employer in each case at hand 
operate to influence the degree of intensity of scrutiny.54 As a result, the intensity of scrutiny 
must necessarily fluctuate according to the facts of each case. The Barry v Midland Bank 
plc55 conception56 of the proportionality standard, which applies in the context of an indirect 
discrimination claim, entails the balancing of the impact or harm suffered by the claimant (as 
a result of the employer applying a provision, criterion or practice) against the requirement of 
the employer to achieve a legitimate aim or objective.57 In each case, the strength of the 
requirement of the employer to achieve the legitimate aim and the harm caused to the 
employee will vary in depth and, thus, so will the intensity of scrutiny of managerial action. 
However, there are two particular ways in which the proportionality standard can be 
contrasted with the range test. First, proportionality is two-dimensional in the sense that an 
adjudicator must evaluate the harm caused to the employer and the aims and objectives of 
the employer. This can be contrasted with the range of reasonable responses test which is 
one-dimensional in its focus, since it generally ignores the effect of the employer's decision 
on the employee58 and instead concentrates on the practices of the employer and 
reasonable employers generally. Secondly, it is submitted that the proportionality standard is 
more intrusive in its scrutiny than the range test on the basis that the former commands the 
adjudicator to engage in value judgments about the desirability and legitimacy of the 
exercise of the employer's prerogative by requiring engagement with the practices and 
policies of the employer and to direct that they be altered or removed if need be. This 
explains cases such as X v Y59 and Pay v Lancashire Probation Service,60 where claimants 
who had been held to have been dismissed in accordance with the range test sought to 
challenge those dismissals as disproportionate infringements of their human rights to private 
life or freedom of expression.61 Whilst the Court of Appeal in X v Y and the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal in Pay v Lancashire Probation Service were of the view that the range of 
reasonable responses test was more or less the same thing as a proportionality standard, as 
the European Court of Human Rights in Pay v UK62 and the arguments of Mantouvalou and 
Collins63 show, this reasoning is arguably unsound. 
 
8. A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The level of scrutiny of managerial action attached to a standard of review enables us to 
appreciate the degree of importance which the judiciary allocates to a particular employment 
right, including the inherent values, ‘practical fairness’ pointers and policy issues. To that 
extent, the general antipathetic judicial attitude to the interests of labour can be laid bare. 
With this in mind, one ought to take tentative steps towards constructing a normative 
framework by which such an hypothesis can be given greater clarity and strength. This can 
be achieved by painting a picture in terms of a spectrum against which intensities of scrutiny 
attached to standards can be charted. 
It is submitted that substance to the notion of varying intensities of scrutiny attached to 
standards can be afforded by adopting and constructing a single reliable metric. The most 
effective metric is to chart standards in terms of the level of interference which they internally 
(by the employer itself) or externally (by an adjudicator) exert over the managerial 
prerogative, ie the degree to which managerial action is called to account internally or 
externally by that standard. For example, a rationality standard – which is essentially the 
same as the Wednesbury64 unreasonableness standard in public law65 and posits that 
liability will only fall upon an employer where no rational employer would have made the 
decision taken – is not particularly intrusive. It is clear that a rationality standard is not as 
interfering from the viewpoint of the employer than a proportionality standard which (as 
argued above) enjoins an adjudicator to evaluate the desirability and legitimacy of the 
practices and policies of the employer. In such circumstances, since the engagement with 
the employer's managerial prerogative in the case of the rationality standard is 
comparatively limited, we can conclude that rationality entails a more limited form of policing 
of the decisions and actions of employers than the proportionality standard and is thus less 
intensive in terms of the scrutiny involved. 
Of course, matters are complicated by the fact that standards may be fixed (eg rationality 
standards, subjective reasonableness and objective reasonableness standards) or floating, 
ie variable (eg the range of reasonable responses and proportionality standards). One might 
argue that it is impracticable to compare fixed standards against variable standards in terms 
of relative intensity of scrutiny for the reason that their diverse natures renders such a 
comparative exercise meaningless. However, it is argued that it is possible, at the very least, 
to identify a ‘baseline’, which is representative of a minimum level of scrutiny associated with 
the floating standard and which increases proportionately with (1) the subjective 
characteristics of the employer, in the case of the range test, or (2) the degree of harm 
suffered by the claimant employee, in the case of the proportionality standard. 
Equipped with this spectrum or metric against which standards may be plotted, it is possible 
to evaluate a legislature's and an adjudicator's attitude to employment rights. In terms of the 
hypothesis advanced above, where the fundamental values, practical fairness issues or 
policy goals associated with an employment right are deemed by a legislature or adjudicator 
to be extremely important, one would expect to see the intensity of scrutiny attached to the 
standards of conduct and review inclined more towards an objective reasonableness or 
proportionality standard. Conversely, standards of conduct and review will be pitched at a 
rationality, subjective reasonableness or range of reasonable responses threshold, where 
employment rights are deemed by the legislature or adjudicators to be comparatively less 
significant or worthy of more limited protection. In such a way, employment rights expressed 
as standards can be benchmarked against the factors which influence the manner in which 
they are articulated. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The formulation advanced in this paper enables a researcher to examine differing 
employment rights and build up a hierarchy of standards, which, in turn, enables the 
significance or relative strength of those employment rights to be charted against a spectrum 
ranging from ‘extremely significant’ to ‘not significant’. A transparent mechanism is thus 
designed in terms of which it is possible to unearth the generally deferential judicial attitude 
to the managerial prerogative in the adjudication of disputes involving employment rights, 
which labour lawyers rightly perceive to be a pervasive phenomenon. This perspective is 
suggestive of an in-built natural drift or movement in standards which is an observational 
point, ie that secondary agents such as adjudicators may (1) provide some latitude to actors 
to whom a standard of conduct is addressed or (2) intervene to render the level of scrutiny 
harsher. Indeed, the marking out of this dynamic is another means of acknowledging the 
incontrovertible proposition that the judiciary are engaged in the development of legal policy 
in the labour law field. The examination of standards of conduct independently from 
standards of review and vice versa is useful inasmuch as it functions to reveal situations in 
which the level of scrutiny exerted externally by the adjudicator pursuant to the standard of 
review may be less, but also more, acute than that attached to the internal standard of 
conduct. 
However, from the perspective of a philosophy which places great value on the internal 
intelligibility and doctrinal coherence of a system of rules, principles and standards in an 
autonomous area of law such as labour law, conceivably, there could be difficulties caused 
by standards of conduct and review which are attached to differing employment rights being 
pitched at differing levels of intensity. The presence of differing intensities of scrutiny of the 
managerial function in the context of different employment rights can be attacked on the 
basis that labour law lacks coherence and is internally contradictory as an independent 
discipline. The point here becomes particularly acute where one conducts a descriptive 
examination of the law governing the regulation of the employment relationship as it 
currently stands in UK law. It soon becomes clear that there are a number of standards or 
approaches to the internal and external scrutiny of the exercise of the managerial 
prerogative. The intensity of these standards of review can be classified within a hierarchy, 
with each set exerting greater or lesser control over the employer's freedom of autonomy in 
terms of the normative framework established in this paper. It is submitted that future 
research can reveal the extent of those difficulties, which will be exposed and explored in 
another paper. 
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